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Abstract
This article introduces the first findings of the Political Party Database Project, a major survey of party organizations in
parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies. The project’s first round of data covers 122 parties in 19 countries. In
this article, we describe the scope of the database, then investigate what it tells us about contemporary party organization
in these countries, focusing on parties’ resources, structures and internal decision-making. We examine organizational
patterns by country and party family, and where possible we make temporal comparisons with older data sets. Our
analyses suggest a remarkable coexistence of uniformity and diversity. In terms of the major organizational resources on
which parties can draw, such as members, staff and finance, the new evidence largely confirms the continuation of trends
identified in previous research: that is, declining membership, but enhanced financial resources and more paid staff. We
also find remarkable uniformity regarding the core architecture of party organizations. At the same time, however, we find
substantial variation between countries and party families in terms of their internal processes, with particular regard to
how internally democratic they are, and the forms that this democratization takes.
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Introduction
How do parties organize, and how much do parties’ orga-
nizational differences matter? The aim of the Political Party
Database (PPDB) Project is to provide systematic answers
to the first question so that we can better answer the second
one, the crucial ‘so what?’ question about party organiza-
tional variations. Other questions we investigate are to what
extent, and why, do parties retain certain structural features
despite changes in their competitive environments? For
instance, are some traditional organizational features
outmoded, such as party conferences and party membership?
If so, these could be nothing more than quaint relics, or they
could be contributing to something other than their nominal
purpose. To use Bagehot’s terminology (1963 [1867]), it is
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possible that parties’ extra-parliamentary organizations
have become the ‘dignified’ elements of party constitu-
tions, with the real work of party politics being done by
the ‘efficient’ parts of the organization, be these the pro-
fessionalized party staffs or the party office holders.
Bagehot wrote that the dignified elements were theatrical
and often old elements which helped ‘to excite and pre-
serve the reverence of the population’ (p. 61); similarly,
some party practices might be remnants of earlier condi-
tions, but which nevertheless still contribute to the legiti-
macy of party government.
Generating legitimacy is not a small thing, as Bagehot
himself noted, so if organizations play that role, this is
important, but we would still want to know whether parties
retain these institutions because they continue to contribute
in other ways. We do not expect to find simple or universal
answers to any of these questions, but we do expect to gain
traction in answering them using systematic data to test
posited relationships. This conviction has inspired the
establishment of the PPDB. In the remainder of this article
we introduce this database and present some of our initial
findings regarding the state of contemporary party organi-
zations in 19 democracies.
The long tradition of comparative party
scholarship: Concepts, categories and data
The comparative study of political parties’ extra-legislative
organizations and activities is more than 150 years old, hav-
ing arisen alongside the emergence of electoral politics. In
the middle third of the 20th century, the comparative study
of political parties was stimulated and redefined by authors
who ambitiously constructed new categories and new causal
theories to explain organizational differences between polit-
ical parties in multiple democracies, and to explain changes
over time (including Duverger, 1954; Kirchheimer, 1966;
Neumann, 1954, and many more). More recent contributors
continued to develop this approach (cf. Panebianco, 1988;
von Beyme, 1985; Ware, 1987). A common feature of these
multi-country studies is their reliance on thick description to
buttress their arguments. Some of their most enduring con-
tributions are now-familiar labels (e.g. mass, catch-all, elec-
toral professional, etc.). Much of the theoretical speculation
in these classic studies treats parties and party organizations
as dependent variables, explaining how contemporary par-
ties bear the marks of their origins, and how organizational
differences reflect institutional contexts and ideological
(party family) similarities.
Echoing general trends in political science, recent decades
have witnessed the rise of more systematic and more quanti-
tative studies of political parties’ organizations and activities
outside the legislative arena. Much of this research relies on
party statutes and documents for evidence about party struc-
tures, sometimes combined with expert judgments about how
parties actuallywork.One notable investigation that combined
both approaches was Kenneth Janda’s pioneering study of
party organization and practices in 53 countries (1980). Janda
and his colleague Robert Harmel later proposed a different
framework for collecting and interpreting data about party
organizational change, one aimed squarely at understanding
practices in democratic regimes (1994). The 1980s also
brought the start of another ambitious effort to gather cross-
party and longitudinal data on party organizational develop-
ment, which became the 12-country Party Organizations: A
Data Handbook on Party Organizations in Western Democ-
racies, 1960-90 (Katz and Mair, 1992). This effort focused on
what the editors dubbed the ‘official story’ approach, primarily
reporting published data and formal rules.
Introducing the PPDB
The PPDB project falls squarely within this tradition of
evidence-drivenapproaches to the comparative studyofpolit-
ical parties.1 It deliberately builds on and extends past efforts,
while aiming to complement, not duplicate, other contempo-
rary efforts to gather data on elections and representation.
Thus, in some cases it replicates questions that have been
used in earlier studies,making it easier to use someofPPDB’s
snapshot data for longitudinal comparisons.
In forming what was essentially a data-gathering colla-
borative endeavour, members of this project agreed to pool
their efforts and standardize variables in order to maximize
the utility of our individual data gathering efforts. In building
our initial team, we deliberately sought out members with
varied theoretical and methodological approaches to the
study of political parties. This diversity is reflected in the data
that we chose to gather. (A full list of those involved in this
data collection effort is included in Appendix 1.)
We decided early on to focus on the official story, in order to
facilitate future replication; this decision also constrained our
choice of variables.2 We also prioritized gathering data that
would be useful for studying parties and their resources as inde-
pendentvariables– inotherwords, thatwouldhelpusanswer the
questions of why and how organizational variations matter.
The PPDB Round 1 data provides information on 122
parties in 19 countries3 during the 2010–2014 period.
These parties include most or all of the parties represented
in the lower houses of their respective national parliaments
at that time, with the exception of France, for which we
have information on only the two parties with the largest
number of legislative seats. The database includes over 300
variables that collectively describe some of the most impor-
tant aspects of party structures and practices. For some
parties and some variables we have readings for more than
1 year; for most, however, we have just one data point. We
have deliberately included most countries included in the
Katz/Mair Data Handbook to maximize the value of the
data. To these we have added (mostly) parliamentary
regimes that differ from the original in many theoretically
relevant ways. For instance, they have different electoral
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systems, different electoral thresholds, use both federal and
unitary structures, have varied lengths of democratic expe-
rience, varied population sizes and disparate levels of state
funding for political parties. In short, this data set offers
multiple opportunities to test questions about how institu-
tional settings can affect the ways that parties organize, and
about when and how this matters.
The conceptual roadmap that guided our choice of indica-
tors was the view that party organizations can usefully be
described in terms of their structures, their resources and their
representative strategies.We further subdivided each of these
dimensions with the aim of answering specific questions. For
instance, a recurring question for scholars is the extent to
which parties should be viewed as unitary actors. In order
to better answer this question, we incorporated indicators
derived from four structural sub-dimensionswhich illuminate
the formal location of decision-making within the party, and
atwhat level (if at all) these decisions are enforced (leadership
autonomy, centralization, coordination and territorial disper-
sion). Similarly, we subdivided the resource dimension into
various categories of resource (including money, members
and staff) in order to better identify dependency relationships
and resource control. Table 1 shows some of the areas cov-
ered, and the specific variables we use to measure them. In a
nutshell, we have collected data on party membership, party
staff, party finance, basic party units, party executive compo-
sition, formal links to collateral organizations, women’s rep-
resentation, leadership selection, candidate selection,
manifesto construction and approval and intra-party referen-
dums. Our conceptual foundation helped to ensure that we
have gathered sufficient data to test the predictions of the
many theories of party organizational change, including those
which posit links between parties’ internal power dynamics
and their resource bases.
Extra-parliamentary parties in
contemporary democracies: Structural
similarities, resource differences?
Taken as a whole, the PPDB provides an extraordinarily
detailed current snapshot of extra-parliamentary parties in
both established and newer democracies. In other publica-
tions, the many authors of this article will use PPDB data to
study the impact and origins of party organizational differ-
ences (see especially Scarrow, Webb, Poguntke forthcoming
2017).Our aimhere ismore straightforwardly descriptive:we
want to use the PPDB data to highlight important similarities
between – andmajor differences across – party organizations
in established party democracies. Inwhat follows, we present
key findings, pointing out important patterns of practice in
terms of resources, structures and linkages.
In this overview, we focus on two main comparisons:
across countries and across party families. Previous studies
give us mixed messages about what patterns we
should expect to find. We know that parties are moulded
by their social and institutional environments as well as by
their ideological heritage (Harmel, 2002; Harmel and
Janda, 1994), but when looking at parties from various
parliamentary systems we are uncertain about whether
ideological leanings (party family) will outweigh the
effects of country-specific institutions. Or indeed, we might
find similarity that crosses both categories. Major contri-
butions towards the literature on party types have drawn
Table 1. Organizational dimensions and sample variables.
Dimensions Sample variables
Structures
Leadership autonomy-
restriction
Rules for leadership selection and
re-selection. Rules for policy-
making. Staff resources of
individual legislators and
leaders.
Centralization-localization Rules for candidate selection.
Distribution of financial
resources across levels.
Coordination-entropy Formal recognition of factions.
Representation of regional
parties in national party
executive. Representation of
legislative party in national
party executive. Openness to
candidates who are not party
members.
Territorial concentration-
dispersion
Number of basic organizational
units. Self-identification as
regional party.
Resources
Financial strength-weakness Party revenue. Party campaign
spending
Resource diversification-
concentration
Proportion of party funding from
public, party and private
sources.
State autonomy-
dependence
Proportion of party funding from
public sources.
Bureaucratic strength-
weakness
Number of professional staff in
extra-parliamentary
organization and for
parliamentary party.
Volunteer strength-
weakness
Membership numbers. Use of
web page to mobilize
volunteer help.
Representative strategies
Individual linkage:
integrated identity –
consumer choice
Membership rules (dues rates,
probationary periods, ease of
joining). Roles for individuals
(members or non-members) in
party decisions.
Group linkage: non-party
group ownership –
autonomy
Statutory roles for group or sub-
group representatives at party
conferences and on party
executive. Actual
representation of sub-group
members in party executive.
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attention to organizational contagion across geographic and
ideological boundaries, identifying a developmental trajec-
tory leading from cadre to mass to catch-all to cartel parties
as the dominant pattern (Duverger, 1954; Epstein, 1968;
Katz and Mair, 1995; Kirchheimer, 1966; Neumann,
1956). These approaches suggest that we should expect our
cross-sectional data set to show a large degree of similarity
in the way parties organize, while ideological or national
factors should not be very important. We will use our com-
prehensive cross-national data to test how well the idea of a
modal party type holds empirically.
Resources: Money, staff, members
We begin by examining three types of resource convention-
ally associated with organizational strength: money, staff
and members. All are potentially important resources that
can help parties to win elections.4
Money
Money is the first – and perhaps most important – resource
on which parties rely. In this section we review what the
PPDB tells us about the incomes of national parties’ head
offices. To facilitate comparison, Table 2 reports national
patterns in four ways: average party income, average party
income relative to the size of national economy, average
income relative to the size of the electorate and the finan-
cial dependence of parties on the state (i.e. percentage of
income from public subsidies). The first of these indicators
tells us which countries have the richest and poorest parties
in absolute terms; inevitably, however, these things can be
Table 2. National party income, by country and party family.
Country/party family
Mean income of national
party head offices
Mean party income per
billion euros of GDP
Party income per
registered voter
Percentage of party income
from direct public subsidies
Country
Australia 17,510,742 (4) 15,757 (4) 1.19 (4) –
Austria 12,521,560 (5) 40,165 (5) 1.96 (5) 79.88 (5)
Belgium 6,919,590 (12) 17,687 (12) 0.86 (12) 75.41 (12)
Canada 15,152,621 (5) 11,200 (5) 0.62 (5) 34.20 (5)
Czech Republic 8,016,845 (5) 50,390 (5) 0.95 (5) 48.14 (5)
Denmark 3,501,990 (8) 13,934 (8) 0.86 (8) 44.13 (8)
France 60,888,527 (2) 28,987 (2) 1.41 (2) 43.90 (2)
Germany 60,701,745 (7) 21,764 (7) 0.98 (7) 35.35 (7)
Hungary 2,378,244 (4) 23,844 (4) 0.29 (4) 81.63 (4)
Ireland 3,178,000 (4) 18,065 (4) 0.99 (4) 68.50 (4)
Israel 2,494,406 (10) 11,986 (10) 0.44 (10) 81.24 (10)
Italy 28,827,778 (5) 17,739 (5) 0.61 (5) 53.75 (4)
Netherlands 4,508,672 (10) 6,997 (10) 0.36 (10) 36.26 (10)
Norway 10,072,069 (7) 26,812 (7) 2.77 (7) 69.16 (7)
Poland 5,324,045 (5) 13,566 (5) 0.17 (5) 54.90 (5)
Portugal 7,102,583 (6) 41,164 (6) 0.37 (6) 74.17 (6)
Spain 45,787,541 (5) 43,220 (5) 1.28 (5) 67.85 (5)
Sweden 10,378,283 (7) 24,526 (7) 1.42 (7) 71.29 (7)
United Kingdom 12,716,844 (7) 6,262 (7) 0.28 (7) 8.76 (7)
Party family
Christian Dem/Cons. 21,386,021 (30) 29,083 (30) 1.13 (30) 55.9 (28)
Social Democrats 25,570,184 (24) 34,076 (24) 1.49 (24) 51.4 (23)
Liberals 8,108,648 (21) 12,673 (21) 0.65 (21) 47.2 (20)
Greens 5,738,709 (13) 8,653 (13) 0.42 (13) 54.8 (12)
Left Socialists 6,883,071 (11) 16,183 (11) 0.49 (11) 60.4 (11)
Far Right 7,188,960 (12) 17,060 (12) 0.81 (12) 77.9 (12)
Overall mean 14,177,811 (118) 21,069 (118) 0.94 (111) 57.50 (113)
b (Country) 0.702*** 0.569** 0.663*** 0.745***
b (Party family) 0.309*** 0.445*** 0.416*** 0.253*
Model R2 0.593*** 0.491 0.572*** 0.643***
Note: All amounts are expressed in Euros (using historical exchange rates as quoted for December each year in http://www.oanda.com/currency/
historical-rates/). The b and Model R2 statistics are from multiple classification analyses, with country and party family as the independent variables. GDP:
gross domestic product. Figures in parenthesis refer to the number of parties. Note that subsidy data for the Australian parties are missing; it is known in
general terms that Australian federal parties are only reimbursed for certain election expenses by the state, but we do not have any Australian data from
a general election year, and are thus obliged to treat the country as missing for this variable.
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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expected to reflect to a considerable extent the relative size
and wealth of each country, and indeed, the generosity of
the state, which is why it is also interesting to examine the
other indicators. For parties for which we have more than 1
year’s worth of data (which is most of the data set), we use
the mean score of all available measures; for others we are
only able to draw on a single year of data. This table breaks
down the data by country and party family in the form of a
Multiple Classification Analysis (MCA), which enables us
to gauge the relative significance of these two factors as
independent variables.5 The key statistics to focus on here
are the b coefficients at the bottom of each column, which
provide a measure of the relative strength of country and
party family effects in explaining variation in each of these
measures.6
In terms of absolute levels of income, it is plain from the
first column in Table 2 that the German, French and Span-
ish parties are much wealthier than those of any other
country on average, while the Italians also receive well
above the overall average of 14.2 million euros per year.
In saying this, we should take note of the fact that we only
have data for the two largest parties in France, which prob-
ably inflates the country’s position relative to others in this
table.7 The Israeli, Hungarian, Irish and Danish parties fea-
ture among the poorest in these terms. When we control for
the size of the national economy, we see that a rather dif-
ferent pattern emerges, in that the Czech, Spanish, Portu-
guese and Austrian parties enjoy most income relative to
gross domestic product (GDP), while the British and Dutch
are poorest. However, if we correct for the number of reg-
istered electors – the size of the body politic, as it were – we
find that the Poles, British and Hungarians are the most
impecunious, with their parties only attracting 17, 28, and
29 cents per registered elector, respectively (see Table 2,
column 3). At the other end of the scale, the Norwegians
and Austrians stand out as being in a league of their own,
with the former country’s parties earning 2.77 euros and the
latter’s slightly under 2 euros per elector. Germany, which
is at the top of the table for the first measure, is only in the
middle of the pack when income is standardized by the size
of the national economy or the number of voters. While
countries vary widely in the per-voter sums available to
their parties, we might reasonably reflect that even two or
three euros per elector is not such a high price to pay for
one’s democracy: arguably, the world’s parliamentary
democracies get their party politics on the cheap. Finally,
the fourth column in Table 2 reveals the extraordinary
extent to which the parties in contemporary democracies
have become financially dependent on the state. In 11 of
the 18 countries for which we have data, the mean depen-
dency ratio is over 50%, and in five countries (Hungary,
Israel, Belgium, Austria and Portugal) it is in the range of
three quarters or more. At the other end of the scale, the
United Kingdom is a stark outlier, with its parties only
deriving an average of 9% of their income from the state.
What of the different party families? The lower panel of
Table 2 reveals a straightforward and not particularly sur-
prising story when the data are broken down this way. The
wealthiest parties are the SocialDemocrats and theChristian
Democrats. These well-established party families have
dominated much of Europe’s post-war history as governing
parties. All other party families have lower, but relatively
similar, average income levels. The ‘big two’ are well above
the overall mean income for the data set, while all others are
considerably below it. This pattern remains broadly true, no
matter howyou look at it – in raw currency values, relative to
national income, or per elector. The Social Democrats do
best in each of these regards, while the Green parties fare
poorest. There is relatively little variation around the mean
in terms of dependence on state funding, except that the
small number of far right parties seem especiallywell served
by state support. Multiple Classification Analysis suggests
that differences between countries explain more of the var-
iance in each of these measures of party income than differ-
ences between party families, in so far as the b coefficients
are always higher for the inter-country variations than for the
inter-family variations. This is, of course, only indicative
evidence: more complex multivariate modelling would be
required to drawmore definitive conclusions. Nevertheless,
it points to the likelihood that patterns of party funding con-
verge around national models more than they do around
typical party family models. Furthermore, the fact that both
inter-country and inter-party family differences are statisti-
cally significant across all of these indicators undermines
the notion that there is any generally ‘typical’ model of party
organization.
Staff
One of the most under-researched fields in the study of
political parties is that of party employees. This is a signif-
icant oversight, which leaves us with a deficient under-
standing of an important aspect of party organizational
development. This is particularly so since it seems likely
that payroll staff are more important than ever before. In
part this is because modern election campaigning and polit-
ical marketing depend on professional expertise. In addi-
tion, it is likely that parties have come to rely increasingly
on paid professionals in the context of party membership
decline and ‘de-energization’ around the democratic world
(see below).
What evidence does our database provide about cur-
rent levels of party staff? In investigating this issue, we
are reminded of one of the main reasons for the dearth of
research into party employees: the sheer difficulty of get-
ting the relevant data. For whatever reason, many parties
tend to be reluctant to provide data on their number of
payroll employees. The PPDB also suffers from the same
reluctance. That said, we believe that we have sufficient
information to generate a meaningful picture. We have
Poguntke et al. 5
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central party staffing data for 15 countries, and legislative
party staffing data for 12 countries, giving us a total of
60–63 parties for our various staffing measures.8 A fur-
ther complication is that snapshot comparisons of party
payroll figures could be misleading if the data come from
different points in the electoral cycle, because many par-
ties hire more staff in election than non-election years. As
it happens, most of the PPDB staffing data comes from
non-election years, with the exceptions being the parties
in Denmark, Ireland (for Fine Gael and Fianna Fail) and
Portugal. This means that the particular snapshot we have
can be regarded as largely representative of parties’
‘normal’ mode of operation in non-election years.
What dowe find, then? Table 3 shows that the Spanish and
British parties have the most head office staff, whether mea-
sured in absolute or relative terms.9 We should perhaps be
wary of taking some of the very low national averages too
literally, because they are either based on very few cases (e.g.
Portugal,Hungary and Israel) or keydata aremissing for large
parties (e.g. the Danish Social Democrats). The figures in
Table 3 on legislative party staff are distorted by an obvious
outlier – Germany, whose parties appear to employ quite
extraordinarily high numbers of parliamentary staff. These
party staff are in fact formally employees of the state; how-
ever, they have a number of functions, some of which are
party-related, so we think that it is justified to regard them
as a party resource.10 Excluding theGerman parties, the aver-
age number of legislative party employees is just 26.2, which
is perhaps a more generally representative figure of the data-
base countries as a whole. Of perhaps as much interest as the
absolute numbers is the comparison between the first and
third columns of Table 3. This shows that parties in countries
such asHungary, Portugal, Israel and Ireland apparently have
more of their human resources in parliaments than in the
national headquarters, while parties in other countries
(including Spain, United Kingdom and the Czech Republic)
have opposite distributions of staff resources.
Of course, the number of staff that parties employ to
assist their MPs might reasonably be expected to reflect
the number of legislators that they return to parliament,
so it is also useful to control for the size of parliamentary
parties in assessing staffing establishments. Hence, Table 3
Table 3. Number of full-time party staff, by country and party family.
Country
Mean number of full-
time paid staff in head
office
Mean number of head office
staff per 1000 party
members
Mean number of full-time paid
staff in legislative
party
Mean number of
legislative
staff per MP
Country
Australia 20.8 (3) 0.4 (3) – –
Belgium 30.5 (10) 1.2 (10) 11.9 (8) 1.0 (8)
Czech Republic 28.3 (4) 1.7 (4) 2.8 (4) 0.1 (3)
Denmark 9.0 (4) 0.8 (4) 23.3 (4) 1.6 (4)
Germany 77.0 (1) 1.2 (1) 726.8 (6) 7.0 (6)
Hungary 12.0 (1) 15.0 (1) 57.8 (4) 1.1 (4)
Ireland 27.0 (3) 1.5 (2) 32.1 (5) 1.9 (4)
Israel 12.5 (2) 0.2 (1) 24.3 (3) 4.5 (2)
Italy 64.0 (4) 0.1 (4) – –
Netherlands 44.5 (2) 1.2 (2) – –
Norway 19.4 (7) 1.0 (6) 24.5 (7) 1.7 (6)
Portugal 1.0 (1) 0.2 (1) 38.0 (6) 2.3 (6)
Spain 105.6 (5) 0.9 (5) 37.7 (5) 0.8 (5)
Sweden 35.8 (8) 1.2 (8) 37.3 (6) 1.1 (6)
United Kingdom 93.1 (7) 1.2 (7) 3.2 (5) 1.2 (5)
Party family
Christian Dem/Cons. 56.9 (15) 1.0 (15) 161.7 (14) 1.9 (13)
Social Democrats 80.3 (13) 0.8 (13) 111.6 (12) 2.0 (12)
Liberals 31.6 (12) 0.1 (12) 65.9 (12) 1.8 (12)
Greens 11.6 (10) 2.6 (9) 62.9 (9) 2.9 (8)
Left Socialists 34.1 (4) 1.3 (4) 89.5 (8) 2.7 (8)
Far Right 18.1 (6) 1.0 (6) 23.2 (6) 0.8 (6)
Overall mean 49.2 (60) 1.3 (59) 95.3 (61) 2.0 (59)
b (Country) 0.541 0.940*** 0.863*** 0.897***
b (Party family) 0.465 0.084 0.137 0.244***
Model R2 0.448 0.914*** 0.766 0.854***
Note: The b and Model R2 statistics are from multiple classification analyses, with country and party family as the independent variables. Figures in
parenthesis refer to the number of parties. MP: Member of Parliament.
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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also reports the mean number of legislative employees per
MP that parties maintain in each country. Overall, this
produces a rather modest figure: the German parties are,
of course, substantially higher than any others, being able
to call on the support of nearly seven staff members for
each MP, but in most other countries the norm is only about
1 or 2. By a similar logic, when evaluating the number of
central party staff as a resource, it is interesting to control
for the numbers of party members whom they might need
to serve. This shows relatively little variation across coun-
try, there being only slightly more than one employee for
every thousand members across the data set as a whole;
Hungary would appear to enjoy the highest central staff/
member ratio, but this is based on a single case for which
we have data, so should be regarded with great caution.
What of patterns by party family? The lower panel of
Table 3 reports these, and shows a pattern that is broadly
familiar from the analysis of financial data, with the Chris-
tian Democratic/Conservative and Social Democratic fam-
ilies predominating in terms of absolute staffing
establishments. That said, the Greens and Left Socialists
employ high quantities of staff relative to their individual
memberships and numbers of MPs. Again, we should note
that the b coefficients generally suggest stronger country
effects than party family effects in respect of party staffing.
Parties and members
The literature on party members has grown considerably
over the past two decades, seemingly in inverse relationship
to the numbers of the subject under investigation (including
most recently Faucher, 2015; Scarrow, 2015; van Haute and
Gauja, 2015). The evidence on the decline of party member-
ship numbers across the democratic world is overwhelming
(van Biezen et al., 2012; Katz, Mair, Bardi et al., 1992). In
Table 4, we update the story of individual party membership
trends by reporting the aggregate membership across all
parties for each country, national membership/electorate
(ME) ratios and MCA results.
The downward trend that has so often been observed
remains apparent in our data. There are 15 PPDB countries
for which we can trace changes over time. The mean aggre-
gate membership figure for these countries was 886,850 per
country at the start of the time series in the 1980s (1990s in
the East European cases); by the mid-to-late 2000s when
van Biezen et al. (2012) reported their figures the average
had fallen to 633,425 for the same countries; and in the
PPDB data for the years 2011–2014, it has dropped to
549,360. Indeed, if we include the four further countries
that are part of the PPDB but were not in the van Biezen
et al. study (Australia, Canada, France and Israel), the
national average falls to just 446,164. Not surprisingly, the
picture is similar even after controlling for the size of elec-
torates; the average ME ratio for the original 15 countries
was 7.50 in the early 1980s (or 1990 in the case of
Hungary), but had declined to 4.14 by the mid-2000s. The
PPDB shows that it now stands at 3.48 (or 3.13 including
Australia, Canada, France and Israel). The only country in
which the ME ratio has not declined in recent years is Ire-
land, which appears to have experienced a modest increase
(from 2.03 to 2.16) in the 5 years following 2008.
What is the picture if we break down the analysis by party
family?Table 4 sheds some light on this question. The pattern
revealed is familiar: as usual, theSocialDemocrats andChris-
tian Democrats have the largest average memberships of any
party family and the highest average ME ratios. Some of the
smaller parties (especially on the FarRight) have surprisingly
highME ratios where they are successful, but this is only in a
limited number of countries. In summary, then, the Christian
Democrats, Conservatives and Social Democrats continue to
have the highest ratios of members to electors in their coun-
tries. Once again, the b coefficients in Table 4 suggest greater
variation by country than by party family.
To summarize, in examining the organizational resources
at the disposal of the 122 parties in our database, we have
found that ME ratios continue to fall in almost all the PPDB
countries, such that little more than 3% of the electorate now
join political parties in these disparate states; that German,
Spanish and French parties seem to be the richest in terms of
funding and staff; that parties in themajority of these democ-
racies now rely on state subsidies for the majority of their
income; and that party staffing levels are relatively modest
in most countries, although extraordinarily high in Ger-
many. Moreover, such variations as we find across these
measures of organizational resources are better explained
by country than by party family.
Structures: Surprising uniformity?
Extra-parliamentary organizations first developed in late
19th and early 20th centuries, stimulated by the organiza-
tional efforts of opposition parties, including Socialists and
workers in Germany, Austria and the United Kingdom, Lib-
erals in theUnitedKingdom, farmers’ parties in Scandinavia
and religious parties in Belgium and the Netherlands. These
parties had widely differing aims, but many of them adopted
very similar organizational structures, operating as ‘subscri-
ber democracies’. In other words, they were clubs with sta-
tutes, membership procedures and annual dues, local
branches, annual or biennial national congresses as the nom-
inally highest party organ and smaller executive committees
holding broad authority between meetings of the national
conference (Morris, 2000; Scarrow, 2015: ch. 2).
By the middle of the 20th century, parties in most parlia-
mentary democracies had adopted some variant of the subscri-
ber democracy model of party organization. Of course, formal
structures may not tell us much about actual distributions of
influence within political parties. Nevertheless, the adoption
and spread of the individual member/congress model seems to
signal acceptance of the idea of parties as micro-polities, and
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recognition that permanent party organization can be useful for
policy implementation and for electoral mobilization.
How much particular party organizations actually con-
tribute to legitimacy, or help electoral mobilization, are
empirical questions. With regard to both legitimacy and
mobilization we would expect that some arrangements are
more effective than others, and that the impact of similar
structures may vary under different circumstances. As a
result, even if many parties adhere to a basically similar
model, we would expect to find cross-party organizational
variation, not least because parties have incentives to
engage in organizational experimentation. For instance, a
string of parties have made headlines in recent years by
claiming that they are going to do politics in a new way,
and that they therefore have novel party structures and
organizational practices. (These include the poetically
named ‘liquid democracy’ of the German Pirates Party, and
the Operating System software of the Italian Five Star
Movement.) If organizational novelty is a voter winner,
we would expect such experimentation to flourish.
Partly confounding this prediction is one striking finding
from our survey of contemporary party organizations in
parliamentary democracies: the sheer uniformity in basic
organizational structures and rules. Both old and new par-
ties adhere to a subscriber democracy organizational model
in which dues-paying members are the polis for most or all
important decisions, and in which the party conference is
(formally) the party’s highest organ.
Table 4. Mean party membership, by country and party family.
Country
Mean party
membership
Mean party membership as % of
national electorate (ME)
Total national
party
membership
Total national membership as %
of national electorate (ME)
Country
Australia (2013) 61,425 (4) 0.42 (4) 245,700 1.67
Austria (2011) 170,704 (5) 2.67 (5) 853,520 13.35
Belgium (2012) 34,542 (11) 0.43 (11) 379,962 4.73
Canada (2011) 50,250 (4) 0.21 (4) 201,000 0.84
Czech Republic
(2011+)
29,482 (5) 0.35 (5) 147,410 1.75
Denmark (2011) 18,706 (8) 0.46 (8) 149,648 3.68
France (2012) 226,743 (2) 0.52 (2) 453,486 1.04
Germany (2012) 217,101 (6) 0.35 (6) 1,302,606 2.10
Hungary (2011) 21,530 (4) 0.26 (4) 86,120 1.04
Ireland (2013) 17,413 (4) 0.54 (4) 69,652 2.16
Israel (2011+) 59,534 (5) 1.05 (5) 351,668 6.21
Italy (2011+) 421,205 (5) 0.90 (5) 2,106,025 4.50
Netherlands (2013) 30,586 (10) 0.24 (10) 305,860 2.40
Norway (2012) 24,237 (6) 0.67 (6) 145,422 4.02
Poland (2013+) 40,257 (6) 0.13 (6) 241,542 0.75
Portugal (2011+) 47,638 (6) 0.50 (6) 285,828 2.98
Spain (2011+) 298,800 (5) 0.84 (5) 1,494,000 4.30
Sweden (2011+) 31,579 (8) 0.43 (8) 252,632 3.44
United Kingdom (2014) 63,735 (7) 0.14 (7) 446,145 0.98
Party family
Christian Dem/Cons. 158,094 (29) 0.91 (29) – –
Social Democrats 130,727 (24) 0.75 (24) – –
Liberals 35,634 (21) 0.35 (21) – –
Greens 14,141 (13) 0.11 (13) – –
Left Socialists 30,353 (10) 0.28 (10) – –
Far Right 36,171 (14) 0.36 (14) – –
Overall mean 85,263 (111) 0.54 (110) 446,164 (19) 3.13 (19)
b (Country) 0.631*** 0.557***
b (Party family) 0.353*** 0.348***
Model R2 0.529*** 0.376***
Note:+ Indicates that year is approximate because data come from various years (e.g. data for some parties in a given country are for 2011, while for
others they might be for 2010 or 2012). Note that the national membership total and ME ratio for France are only based on two parties, and so are
certainly underestimates of the true figures. The total national membership for Israel is based on data for six parties, but the MCA is only able to include
data for 5 Israeli parties since it was not possible to ascribe a meaningful party family to the National Religious Party. The Canadian data, based on 2011
news reports, do not include the Conservative Party as no reliable numbers were available; thus, both the overall total and party mean numbers are
somewhat artificially low. ME: membership/electorate.
Significance level: ***p < 0.01.
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Representative assemblies
Almost all the party statutes establish representative struc-
tures for internal decision-making,with the party congress at
the formal apex. The following section says more about the
formal distribution of power among party levels; for now,
what we want to emphasize is that the member/congress
template still plays a prominent role in party claims to be
internally democratic. Most party statutes stipulate that the
party congresses will meet regularly, with 75% of parties
requiring these assemblies to be heldmore than once every 3
years. Across party families there is modest variation in the
frequency with which these need to be held. Most notably,
three quarters ofGreen Parties require their congress tomeet
at least annually. In contrast, the ‘old left’ Left Socialists
tend to set looser requirements, with 40% stipulating that
party congresses must be held only once every 4 or 5 years.
Most parties have a smaller executive committee head-
ing their extra-parliamentary organizations. Because these
bodies have different names across parties, we asked our
respondents to tell us about the highest executive body
recognized in the party statutes. In other words, we are not
interested in cabinet meetings or informal meetings
between party leaders and their trusted advisors. As a rough
rule of thumb, we suggest that the smaller these bodies are,
the more likely it is that they are conducting some of the
real business of leading the party. About half the parties
have executive committees with 20 or fewer members;
these are small enough to be effective governing bodies.
When we compare this to analyses based on the data docu-
mented in the Katz/Mair Handbook, we see a remarkable
stability in the configuration of the essential intra-party
bodies. In other words, organizational innovation has been
very limited over time (Poguntke, 2000: ch. 6).
In the majority of parties (56%), these executive com-
mittees report directly to the party congress. Most of the
remaining parties have one additional medium-sized com-
mittee between the party congress and the executive. The
incidence of such intermediate-level committees is inver-
sely related to the frequency of the required meetings of
party congresses: the more committee layers, the greater
the time span between required meetings of the party con-
gress (r¼ 0.259). In terms of the relation between different
‘faces’ of the party within the party organs, it is noteworthy
that legislators are well-represented in the organs of the
extra-parliamentary parties: in half the parties, at least
20% of the party’s executive committee are also members
of the national legislature.
Leadership powers
Despite the widespread adherence to the subscriber-
democracy organizational model, party statutes vary
widely in the powers and responsibilities they grant to their
party leaders. These differences affect both the extent to
which leaders’ roles are spelled out in statutes, and the
specified relationship between the party leader and the
extra-parliamentary party. Among those that explicitly
address the leader’s role, two-fifths refer to the leader’s
position as external representative of the party. Just over
a quarter specify that the leader is formally accountable to
the party congress. In terms of leaders’ obligations and
powers, a fifth of the party statutes give the party leader
the right to help select his or her deputy, and to summon the
party congress, while nearly a third give the leader the right
to summon the party officials.11 More than 90% of the
statutes explicitly mention that the party leader could or
should attend the party congress or party executive. A small
number (5%) formally give their leaders the right to
approve or veto coalition agreements; similarly, only 7%
of the parties give the party leader a statutory right to
appoint one or more members of the party executive.
The nine items mentioned above can be combined to
produce an additive index of leadership power. Parties are
widely dispersed on this index, approximately following a
normal distribution, but no party earns the top possible
score for leadership autonomy (see Appendix 2 for details).
As Table 5 shows, on average the parties do not give their
leaders so many of these powers, the overall mean being
3.29 for the 81 cases for which we are able to generate
index scores. The score for Italy (7.0) is far higher than for
any other country, but this is derived from just one party
(the Democrats). In fact, only 5% of all PPDB cases score
as highly as this, so it is far from typical. Around three
quarters of parties score between 3 and 5 on the leadership
power index, with Spain, Portugal, Canada, Hungary and
Belgium achieving the highest averages, and Australia,
Germany and the Netherlands the lowest. In terms of party
families, the Far Right give their leaders most formal
power and the Left Socialists least, with the other families
being fairly tightly clustered between these two political
antipodes. As usual, however, it is evident from the b coef-
ficients that country effects are far stronger than party
family effects in explaining variation in this aspect of party
organization.
To be sure, statutes do not tell us everything about how
parties distribute decision-making authority between the
party leader, the extra-parliamentary organization, and the
parliamentary party. Yet, the correlations in Table 6 point
towards an interesting and consistent pattern, which
indicates that formal powers are systematically related to
other aspects of parties’ organizational life: the larger the
party (whether in terms of members, seats held in the leg-
islature or number of people sitting on the national execu-
tive), the greater the leader’s power. It is also noteworthy
that leaders’ rights seem to grow the more frequently par-
ties hold congresses. On the face of it, this is a counter-
intuitive finding, although it might simply be a function of
party size, in that larger parties can afford to hold more
frequent congresses.
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To conclude, the predominant finding of this section is
the striking similarity in what might be termed the organi-
zational skeletons of the parties. Whereas the previous sec-
tion showed considerable cross-national variation in the
distribution of resources, this section shows the continued
dominance of the subscriber democracy model across
established and newer democracies, and across party fam-
ilies. This enduring similarity is seldom remarked upon, but
we find it notable, not least because it has survived several
waves of populist challenges over the past four decades.
Parties that proudly deviate from this basic model, and
which claim to pursue a new brand of democracy, tend to
receive a great deal of attention from journalists and scho-
lars alike. In fact, however, few of those parties have gained
enough traction to join and stay in national legislatures for
multiple terms. Those that do remain have tended to change
their organizations in ways that make them more similar to
the organizations of their older peers. Such organizational
convergence is undoubtedly encouraged by national regu-
lations and statutes that dictate some of the fundamental
organizational options for parties and/or voluntary organi-
zations. Yet that is not the whole explanation, because in
some cases party structures predate the laws, and in any
case parties themselves are in a position to alter the regu-
lations if they wished to do so. If the organizational con-
vergence is not driven by ideology, perhaps it has been
driven by the model’s functional utility (cf. Poguntke,
1998), and/or by its perceived legitimacy.
Parties as democratic linkage
Measuring intra-party democracy
We have seen in the previous section that political parties
largely resemble each other when it comes to the config-
uration of their core party bodies. However, when we take a
closer look at how their organizations provide for linkage to
the citizenry, we find remarkable variation. This is at odds
with the prevailing narrative in the literature that assumes a
succession of dominant party types.
The membership organization of political parties is one
of their principal ways of generating linkage to society
(Poguntke, 2000). While adherents of a Schumpeterian
view of democracy would argue that democracy does not
necessarily require democratic linkage through parties, oth-
ers maintain that it is virtually unthinkable except in these
terms. Obviously, we cannot decide this debate here. How-
ever, our data allows us to investigate the empirical realities
irrespective of normative desirability. We have collected
data on a considerable number of variables that are related
to the democratic quality of political parties’ internal pol-
itics. These can be combined to create valid measures of
intra-party democracy (IPD). For details of the construction
of these measures see Appendix 3 and von dem Berge and
Poguntke (forthcoming 2017).
As defined here, the benchmark of IPD is that it max-
imizes the involvement of party members in the decisions
that are central to a party’s political life, including pro-
gramme writing, and personnel selection and other intra-
organizational decision-making.12 From this perspective, it
seems plausible to argue that the degree of organizational
decentralization represents a distinct component of IPD
that should be measured independently of general inclu-
siveness, a point several scholars have made elsewhere
(Hazan and Rahat, 2010; Scarrow, 2005: 6; von dem Berge
et al., 2013). However, for the sake of parsimony, in this
examination we will focus solely on the degree of
Table 6. Leadership strength and other party organs, bivariate
relationships.
Correlation N
Executive size 0.245** 78
Congress frequency 0.257** 74
Number of party members 0.294*** 80
% of seats in national legislature 0.215* 81
Note: N refers to the number of parties.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10.
Table 5. Leadership strength, by country and party family.
Country/party family Leadership strength
Country
Australia 2.25 (4)
Belgium 4.44 (9)
Canada 4.80 (5)
Czech Republic 3.00 (5)
Denmark 3.00 (8)
Germany 2.50 (6)
Hungary 4.50 (4)
Ireland 3.50 (4)
Italy 7.00 (1)
Netherlands 2.50 (2)
Norway 3.50 (6)
Portugal 5.00 (5)
Spain 5.40 (5)
Sweden 3.13 (8)
United Kingdom 3.29 (7)
Party family
Christian Dem/Cons. 3.95 (21)
Social Democrats 3.95 (19)
Liberals 3.63 (16)
Greens 3.13 (8)
Left Socialists 2.78 (9)
Far Right 4.33 (6)
Overall mean 3.70 (79)
b (Country) 0.722***
b (Party family) 0.346*
Model R2 0.608
Note: Figures in parenthesis refer to the number of parties.
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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inclusiveness to measure IPD, because empirically these
concepts overlap. For instance, a higher degree of decen-
tralization automatically leads to a higher degree of inclu-
siveness because when more party bodies are involved (like
the German Land parties or the British constituency par-
ties), more members will be involved – even if these are the
local party leaders and not all the members.13
Two variants of IPD
In measuring IPD we make a theoretically based distinction
between assembly-based and plebiscitary variants of IPD,
constructing separate indices to measure both types of IPD.
Each of these represents a different approach to discerning
the will of the group. Assembly-based IPD assigns
decision-making to meetings, whose participants debate
propositions and then take a decision. Plebiscitary IPD
separates the stages of debate and decision-making, and
places the latter stage in the hands of the mass membership
via a ballot. Both types may be more or less inclusive.
While assembly-based IPD is often associated with deci-
sions made by a meeting of party delegates, it also includes
decisions made at town hall type assemblies in which all
attendees are eligible to debate and vote. We contend that
plebiscitary decision-making embodies a fundamentally
different logic as it provides no way to deliberate and
reach compromise. It is the politics of ‘either/or’, which
arguably gives a lot of power to the leaders (Katz and
Mair, 1995: 21), even though it may also be exploited as
a leadership-challenging device. In contrast, assembly-
based IPD provides opportunities to amend the question
and to take repeated rounds of voting. What counts for us
now is that it follows an inherently different logic (Cross
and Katz, 2013).
Following this logic, our assembly-based IPD-index
(AIPD) measures the inclusiveness of party decision-
making based on discussions within party bodies and
assemblies, including assemblies of all members. It covers
the three essential components of IPD, namely programme
writing, personnel selection (leaders and candidates) and
organizational structure (referring to the relative strength of
party bodies like congress and executive). A higher index
score indicates that a more inclusive party body has the
final say on decisions over personnel and policy and
intra-organizational power is less top-heavy (von dem
Berge and Poguntke (2017).
Our plebiscitary IPD index (PIPD) measures the degree
to which parties allow for non-assembly decisions on a one
member, one vote basis. These decisions are made by the
lone party member at home on a computer screen, or via the
casting of a ballot through the post or a party-run polling
station. It covers only programme-writing and personnel-
selection. A higher index score means that a party provides
more opportunities for ballots in these matters. The PIPD
index assigns a positive value to all parties which
incorporate such procedures in their rules, even if they are
optional or apply only in certain situations or are combined
with assembly-based procedures. It is difficult to envisage a
large party organization which is exclusively based on ple-
biscitary decision-making (even though the Italian Five Star
Movement may come close), but we found a surprisingly
high number of parties which mix these two decision styles.
Over 55% of the parties in our study provide for some ple-
biscitary decision-making.
There are several reasons why the two variants of IPD
are combined in different ways in individual party families
and countries. For instance, highly inclusive plebiscitary
procedures might be a substitute for less inclusive assembly-
based procedures. Think, for example, of a populist party
which uses plebiscites to legitimate the policies of its leader-
ship while providing little space for genuine internal discus-
sion. Such substitution strategies are not necessarily confined
to populist parties. A key element of the cartel party argument
is the suggestion that leaders of established parties may seek
to enhance their autonomy by promoting plebiscitary modes
of decision-making which bypass middle-level elites
(Katz and Mair, 1995: 21). Yet inclusive plebiscitary proce-
dures could also be additive, if parties with a strong tradition
of assembly based internal democracy feel compelled to
adapt to the pressure of a public discourse which regards
plebiscitary decision-making as inherently superior to assem-
bly based modes of democracy (Fuchs, 2007; Pappi, 2015:
224–25; Zittel, 2006). In the populist case, we would expect a
very low AIPD score to go together with a high PIPD value,
while in the latter (‘pan-democratic’) case we would expect a
positive correlation. Finally, party legislation or institutional
learning may induce fairly similar patterns of IPD in some
countries while the absence of such mechanisms may lead to
substantial within-country variation.
Conceptually, our AIPD measure is a formative index
(Diamantopoulos et al., 2008; Diamantopoulos and Winkl-
hofer, 2001) consisting of three logically independent com-
ponents: programme-writing, personnel-selection and
organizational structure. Unfortunately, for many of our
cases we have incomplete information about all three
components. However, because testing shows that these
components are highly correlated, we have decided to
include all cases with valid data for at least 2 of our 3
components.14 Our calculations are based on data for the
years 2011–2014 using the most recent available measure-
ment point.
We start by asking whether our conceptual distinction
between assembly-based and plebiscitary IPD holds
empirically. First, the relatively weak Pearson correlation
coefficient of 0.37 indicates that both indices are related,
yet most likely measure separate dimensions. This supports
our contention that it makes sense to look at both dimen-
sions when trying to assess the extent to which parties are
internally democratic, because some parties are inclusive
with one type of procedure, but not with the other.
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Patterns of IPD: Divergence rather than uniformity
When we turn to simple descriptive statistics, we also see
substantial differences between our two measures. Both
indices have a theoretical minimum of 0 and a maximum
of 1. The results for the assembly-based IPD index show
that all but one of the 122 parties included in our study
have internal structures that offer at least some internal
democracy. The exception is the one-man Dutch Freedom
Party of Geert Wilders which has no party members and
hence no internal structure to speak of. It has therefore
been coded missing for our IPD indices. Our data show
that the AIPD index, which measures IPD based on meet-
ings and exchange of arguments within party bodies, rep-
resents the essential core of IPD. We have a valid
measurement for all parties, and none of the parties
comes close to the minimum possible value of our index
(the lowest value is 0.26) while some parties go all the
way towards almost perfectly democratic internal proce-
dures (see Appendix A3). Whereas most parties cluster in
the middle range of the AIPD index, the pattern changes
substantially for the plebiscitary variant of IPD. More
than 40% of the parties in our study have not institutio-
nalized any plebiscitary mechanisms, but some parties
reach our maximum value of 1.0.
When we break down our data by country, we clearly
find that nation-specific factors play an important role, a
finding which further weakens the notion of any over-
arching tendency among parties. Table 7 reports the
assembly-based and plebiscitary IPD indices, by country.
Let us first focus on the assembly-based IPD. There is
some spread within countries – and this is to be expected
– but in 11 of the 19 countries the difference between the
highest and lowest AIPD score is not more than 30
points, and in some countries, it is considerably less
(e.g. Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Norway, Portu-
gal, and Spain). There are greater differences in the gen-
eral levels of AIPD between countries. Austria, France,
Poland, Portugal and Spain stand out for having relatively
low AIPD values, while Belgium, Germany, Ireland, the
Netherlands, Norway and the UK are characterized by
generally high levels of AIPD.
The picture changes entirely when we focus on the
plebiscitary variant of IPD. Here we see two patterns.
There is considerably more spread within countries: in
some countries, there is complete uniformity because of
the absence of plebiscitary practices (Austria, Czech
Republic and Poland), in 14 countries one or more parties
have not introduced any plebiscitary measures, while a
few of the other countries stand out because most or all
parties register fairly high PIPD values (Belgium,
Canada, Italy and the United Kingdom). In the latter four
countries, it seems reasonable to speculate that we are
seeing the effect of institutional diffusion. In the remain-
ing countries, parties vary widely in the extent to which
they have adopted plebiscitary mechanisms. If diffusion
pressures are strong, we would expect that coming years
will bring an upward convergence on the PIPD index, at
least in countries where at least one party has already
adopted such measures.
A closer look at the main party families shows clear
differences between them in terms of IPD usage. They do
not, however, always meet the obvious theoretical expec-
tations. For instance, while the Greens are associated with
calls for democratization of public life, overall they have
only a mid-range score on our plebiscitary index, although
they are the most inclusive party family when it comes to
assembly-based intra-party politics. The Social Democrats,
on the other hand, come closest to our pan-democratic
model, with comparatively high scores for both types of
practices (see Table 7). Christian Democrats/Conservatives
Table 7. Assembly-based and plebiscitary IPD, by country and
party family.
Country/party
family AIPD
AIPD
range PIPD
PIPD
range
Country
Australia 0.64 (4) 0.10 0.38 (4) 0.67
Austria 0.46 (5) 0.40 0.00 (5) –
Belgium 0.71 (12) 0.39 0.60 (12) 0.75
Canada 0.68 (5) 0.07 0.57 (5) 0.34
Czech Republic 0.64 (5) 0.10 0.00 (3) –
Denmark 0.57 (8) 0.48 0.15 (8) 0.50
France 0.40 (2) 0.19 0.50 (2) –
Germany 0.73 (6) 0.30 0.21 (6) 0.50
Hungary 0.68 (4) 0.27 0.06 (4) 0.25
Ireland 0.72 (5) 0.32 0.13 (5) 0.67
Israel 0.62 (6) 0.50 0.42 (6) 1.00
Italy 0.49 (5) 0.45 0.67 (5) 0.67
Netherlands 0.78 (9) 0.41 0.44 (9) 1.00
Norway 0.76 (6) 0.05 0.21 (6) 0.50
Poland 0.48 (6) 0.17 0.00 (5) –
Portugal 0.44 (6) 0.11 0.25 (6) 0.50
Spain 0.39 (5) 0.08 0.07 (5) 0.33
Sweden 0.62 (8) 0.25 0.09 (8) 0.25
United Kingdom 0.78 (7) 0.33 0.63 (7) 0.42
Party family
Christian Dem/
Cons.
0.59 (30) 0.58 0.26 (28) 1.00
Social
Democrats
0.67 (24) 0.62 0.45 (24) 1.00
Liberals 0.63 (21) 0.58 0.35 (21) 1.00
Greens 0.73 (14) 0.73 0.32 (14) 0.75
Left Socialists 0.60 (11) 0.47 0.12 (11) 0.50
Far Right 0.55 (14) 0.62 0.22 (13) 1.00
Overall mean 0.63 (114) 0.31 (111)
b (Country) 0.700*** 0.692***
b (Party family) 0.256** 0.213
Model R2 0.589*** 0.561**
Note: Figures in parenthesis refer to the number of parties. PPDB: Political
Party Database; AIPD: assembly-based intra-party democracy; PIPD:
plebiscitary intra-party democracy.
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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conform to the conventional wisdom in that they register
average assembly-based IPD scores and fairly low plebis-
citary values.
Surprisingly, the Far Right does not score high on the
plebiscitary index even though this category encompasses
populist right-wing parties.15 Finally, the most notable
result is that Left Socialist parties are by far the most reluc-
tant party family when it comes to plebiscitary measures. It
seems plausible to speculate that this may reflect the influ-
ence of traditional left-wing organizational thinking, with
its considerable emphasis on party discipline. Although
plebiscitary politics have often been linked with political
extremism, our evidence suggests that parties on the far left
or right of the spectrum have been most hesitant to embrace
plebiscitary measures.
Finally, when looking at the b values in Table 7 we
see once again the familiar story of much stronger effects
by country than by ideological family. However, there are
considerable differences regarding the balance between
assembly-based and plebiscitary forms of IPD, which
reminds us that we should not too readily generalize
about one dominant organizational model of party
organization.
Connecting resources, structures
and linkages
After presenting this descriptive overview of the main find-
ings of the PPDB Round 1 data, it is the time to begin
examining how our three analytical dimensions relate to
one another empirically. This is not the place to investigate
and test causal hypotheses, but we can at least provide the
grounds for developing such hypotheses by exploring some
basic statistical relationships within the data. We do this
here by reporting the simple bivariate correlation coeffi-
cients for a number of indicators that are drawn from across
the three dimensions. The key indicators include AIPD as a
measure of democratic linkage, leadership strength as a
measure of organizational structure, and three organiza-
tional resource measures: ME ratio, party income/GDP
ratio, and percentage of party income that comes from state
subsidies.
The results reveal a number of interesting relationships
across the three dimensions of analysis. First, in terms of
association between AIPD and the other dimensions, we
find that the less internally democratic parties are, the more
members they have relative to electors, the richer and the
more dependent on state funding they are, and the stronger
their leaders are. The last two of these correlations are
statistically significant at the 5% significance level or bet-
ter. Second, there are also politically noteworthy associa-
tions between organizational structure and resources, in
that the stronger leaders are within their parties, the more
members they have as a proportion of the electorate, and
the richer and the more dependent on state funding they
tend to be; these are all statistically significant relationships
at the 5% level or better. The relevant details are reported in
Table 8.
These correlations point to areas for further investi-
gation. For instance, they suggest different categories of
parties that might exist. The first is a group of parties
that are (in national terms) large, rich and heavily
dependent on state subsidies; these will also tend to
be relatively ‘top-down’, leader-dominated organiza-
tions. By contrast, the second group is the opposite of
all these things: it consists of parties that are (in their
own national contexts) relatively small, poor, and not so
well supported by the state, but which are more intern-
ally democratic and less leadership-dominated. Whether
we can actually distinguish such clusters of parties is a
task for future research.
Our preliminary findings also invite researchers to
address some of the major ‘so what?’ questions of this
field of political science: for instance, what are the con-
sequences of these organizational patterns for the legiti-
macy of party and political systems? If a country has a
preponderance of large, leader-dominated and state-
dependent parties, does this lead to higher levels of
public dissatisfaction with the parties and/or political
systems as a whole? And what of the consequences for
public policy: are such countries more or less likely to
generate policy outcomes that represent the views of a
majority of electors? Here, we can only raise such ques-
tions rather than attempt to answer them. However, we
suggest that the PPDB data and measures not only point
the way for politically important lines of future research
but also provide some tools that should help researchers
who want to tackle these research puzzles.
Conclusions
Our analyses of the PPDB data have demonstrated a
remarkable coexistence of uniformity and diversity. When
it comes to some of the main indicators of party organiza-
tional capacity such as party members, staff and finance, all
evidence points in the direction of continuing trends that
Table 8. Correlations across dimensions.
AIPD
Leadership
strength
Leadership strength 0.254** (81)
Party income fromstate (%) 0.272*** (113) 0.375*** (76)
Party income/GDP 0.117 (118) 0.237** (80)
ME ratio 0.151 (114) 0.223** (80)
Note: Figures in parenthesis represent number of parties. ME:
membership/electorate; AIPD: assembly-based intra-party democracy;
GDP: gross domestic product.
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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have been diagnosed for many years. Comparisons with
previous studies clearly show that in most cases party mem-
bership has continued to decline, while financial resources
and paid labour have continued to grow. Yet, substantial
differences persist between party families and, more impor-
tantly, between countries.
On the other hand, we find truly remarkable uniformity
regarding the core architecture of party organizations.
Despite the enormous attention some groups of new parties
have attracted in the media and in scholarly literature, the
evidence is clear: if they survive, they adapt their organiza-
tional skeleton to a common template. Virtually all have
regular party conferences which function as supreme ‘law
making’ intra-party bodies; they normally have one (some
two) party leaders with clearly defined powers, and they
tend to have a supreme executive body. This convergence
occurs even where laws do not require it, suggesting that in
these countries this organizational style has become a nor-
mative imperative or a functional necessity – or both.
This image of overwhelming uniformity changes
again when we look more closely at how these
member-associations operate, creating indices to mea-
sure their openness with regard to assembly-based and
plebiscitary democracy. Here, we find substantial varia-
tion between countries and party families. While
assembly-based IPD is the standard model of intra-
party decision-making, at greater or lesser degrees of
inclusiveness, the provisions for plebiscitary IPD vary
substantially. They are simply non-existent in a consid-
erable number of parties, and in some countries alto-
gether. Overall, we see rather wide variation in how
parties combine these different types of practices, and
in the extent to which they have expanded the locus of
decision-making.
In sum, one clear message from this preliminary exam-
ination of the first round PPDB data is that there is still a lot
of mileage in closer examination of the details of party
organization. Uniformity, which is all too often in the lime-
light, is clearly only part of the story. While scholars have a
tendency to look for organizational trends, individual par-
ties often seek to gain electoral advantage through organi-
zational innovation. Thus, while party organizations across
modern democracies have much in common now, there is
more diversity, particularly between countries, than many
classics of the party literature imply. If parties and their
popular organizations can play crucial roles in integrating
citizens and their political demands into the political pro-
cess, as much literature on representative democracy
asserts, then these organizational differences deserve con-
tinued scrutiny, because they can have important political
consequences.
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Notes
1. Those using Political Party Database Round 1 data should
reference this article for a full introduction to the data set and
to acknowledge those who contributed to it. The data is avail-
able from the project website as of 1 January 2017.
2. We consciously violated this rule in a few places, for instance
when we asked team members to not only give the official
rules for candidate selection but to also give an expert opinion
about which levels of the party had the most influence in the
most recent round of candidate selections. In these places,
those who distrust the judgment of a single expert can ignore
these variables and rely solely on the official stories.
3. The countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Ire-
land, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. For a full list of
parties covered in Round 1, see website.
4. This is not to overlook the obvious fact that party members
might also be considered a form of linkage between parties
and society, but here they will be examined from the perspec-
tive of organizational resources.
5. We assigned parties to party families following this rubric:
according to membership in various transnational party orga-
nizations, if available. If not, we asked our country team
leaders to code into one of seven categories, or ‘other’.
Because parties themselves showed most movement over
time between the ‘far right’ and ‘radical populist’ labels,
we combined these parties for purposes of this article.
6. Multiple classification analysis is an additive modelling tech-
nique which is appropriate for interval-level dependent vari-
ables and nominal-level independent variables, as is the case
here. The b coefficients express the explained variance in the
dependent variable as a proportion of the total variance, while
controlling for the effects of other independent variables.
More precisely, the explained variance is taken to be that
which is accounted for by the categories of the independent
variables. This is ‘between groups’ variance (in our case, the
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variance explained by membership of either country or party
family groups), while any other unexplained variance is
‘within-groups’ variance. The rank-order of the bs tells us
the relative importance of the predictors in a model. The b
coefficients’ significance levels are based on the F-ratio sta-
tistic (Retherford and Choe, 1993).
7. In addition, our results may be distorted somewhat because it
includes data on election years for 7 of our 19 countries.
8. Unfortunately, there are rather fewer cases for which we have
both central and legislative party staffing data – only approx-
imately one-third of the total number of parties, which we feel
is too few from which to gain a clear picture, so we do not
report those figures here.
9. This also appears true of Germany, but we have head office
staffing data for only one German party, so we cannot be sure
if this is representative.
10. The extraordinary number of staff employed by parliamentary
parties in Germany owes something to the difficulty of attract-
ing state funding beyond a fixed ‘absolute ceiling’ which limits
the overall sum of money that can go from the state to political
parties. This ceiling did not change for many years until the
Bundestag introduced indexation in 2013. The way around this
for the partieswas to increase the number of their parliamentary
staff, all ofwhomare paid for by the state.According toGerman
legal doctrine, theirworkpertains to the sphere of the state rather
than the parties, since formally the parliamentary parties are not
supposed to do things that directly benefit the extra-
parliamentary party. The reality, however, is that these person-
nel often split their time between working for MPs as personal
assistants and working for the parliamentary (and sometimes
extra-parliamentary) parties. In this way they clearly constitute
a resourceof the party, then; however, it does render theGerman
situation somewhat unique, so readersmay prefer to exclude the
German figures when reflecting on the overall averages for
parliamentary party staff.
11. Perhaps unexpectedly, there are no large differences between
party families in terms of the leader’s accountability to the party
conference. Green parties were slightly more likely to specify
this, but all party families were in the range from 25–37%.
12. Our indices include only rights for full members, and do not
take account of whether similar rights are offered to regis-
tered supporters or other kinds of party affiliates. Thus, the
indices do not rate parties more highly if they open partici-
pation to non-members. Our theoretical justification is that
including open procedures strains the theoretical notion of
‘intra’ party democracy, which is our primary interest here.
Within the current Political Party Database universe, these
situations are empirically rare, though some have been high
profile cases, such as the UK Labour Party election in 2015
which allowed participation by ‘registered supporters’ who
were not full members.
13. The indices used in this section are based on von dem Berge
and Poguntke, 2017. Other members of the Political Party
Database team have constructed different indices of IPD for
other articles. We do not suggest that this coding scheme is
the only way to analyse differences in intra-party governance,
but we think it is a plausible one. Different coding schemes
would affect the details of relationships reported in the fol-
lowing sections, but probably would not change their major
conclusions.
14. The situation is different for the plebiscitary index which
includes only two components. Here we have simply used all
available data.
15. To a degree, this may be due to the fact that we have com-
bined two party groups that analytically belong to separate
categories, namely extreme right and populist right-wing par-
ties. We have chosen to do so because this distinction, even
though theoretically meaningful, is frequently empirically
fuzzy as many parties meander between extreme right-wing
and more ‘acceptable’ right-wing populist appeals. If we look
at the two groups separately, we can see that populists record
higher PIPD values (0.32 and 0.14). However, they are still
not conspicuously high.
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Appendix 1
Appendix 2
Appendix 3
The IPD indices
Assembly-based intra-party democracy (AIPD). Our assembly-
based intra-party democracy index is based on relevant
Political Party Database variables which were recoded
according to their bearing on the inclusiveness of intra-
party decision-making. As a rule, we coded variable
items as 0.00 or 0.25 if they indicate that a given party
has no or a modest level of inclusiveness on this spe-
cific aspect of intra-party democracy; 0.50 was allo-
cated for a medium level and 0.75 and 1.00 for high
levels of inclusiveness. In some cases this involved
ranking party arenas first according to their inclusive-
ness. Table A3 illustrates the logic: A party where the
party congress has a final vote on the manifesto has the
highest score on this particular aspect while a party
where the leader has the final word is considered to
be least inclusive.
The AIPD index is made up of three components for
which we have a different number of variables. In order
to weigh them equally, we have first calculated a score
for each component; the final AIPD index value is then
the arithmetic mean of the three components. Table B3
shows all items that have been used. As it is impossible
to document all coding rules in this appendix, please
refer to the Political Party Database website for a
detailed documentation.
Table A2. Index of leadership strength.
Index Frequency %
1.0 4 4.9
2.0 7 8.6
3.0 34 42.0
4.0 15 18.5
5.0 11 13.6
6.0 6 7.4
7.0 4 4.9
Sum 81 100.0
Note: This is a composite index constructed by adding together the
total number of leadership rights from the following items: Leader may
help select deputy leader (21%); may summon party officials (31.6%);
may summon party congress (22.1%); may attend party executive
(93.6%); may attend party congress (91.6%); may appoint at least one
member of party executive (7.2%); must consent to coalition
agreements (5.3%); is designated party’s ‘external representative’
(41.1%); is expressly accountable to party congress (27.4%). Each
‘right’ is coded 1; where the leader does not have a right, it is coded 0.
Note that where a leader is not statutorily accountable to party
congress it is coded 1. The index has a theoretical range running from
0 to 9, although empirically it only runs from 1 to 7.
Table A1. PPDB round 1 country teams.
Australia Anika Gauja
Austria Wolfgang C. Mu¨ller, Mane`s Weisskircher
Belgium Kris Deschouwer, Emilie van Haute
Canada William Cross, Scott Pruysers
Czech Republic Petr Kopecky´
Denmark Karina Kosiara-Pedersen
France Elodie Fabre
Germany Thomas Poguntke, Sophie Karow, Jan Kette
Hungary Zsolt Enyedi, Daniel Rona
Ireland David M. Farrell, Connor Little
Israel Gideon Rahat, Alona Dolinsky
Italy Luciano Bardi, Enrico Calossi, Eugenio
Pizzimenti
Netherlands Ruud Koole, Marijn Nagtzaam
Norway Elin Allern
Poland Aleks Szczerbiak, Anna Mikulska
Portugal Marina Costa-Lobo, Isabella Razuolli
Spain Ta`nia Verge, Arnau Rovira
Sweden Nicholas Aylott, Niklas Bolin
United Kingdom Paul Webb, Annika Hennl, Dan Keith
Database Editor Susan Scarrow
Data Manager Benjamin Danforth
Project
Directors
Thomas Poguntke, Susan Scarrow, Paul
Webb
Advisory Board Ingrid van Biezen, Kenneth Janda, Richard Katz,
Miki Caul Kittilson
Note: Coordinators listed in boldface type.
Table A3. Example of coding PPDB variables. PPDB-Question:
Who has the final vote on the manifesto?
PPDB answer
option AIPD value Effect on AIPD
Party Congress 1.00 (max IPD; most
‘inclusive’)
High
inclusiveness
Party Sub-Units 0.75
Party Legislators 0.50 Medium
inclusivness
Executive
Committee
0.25 Low inclusivenes
Party Leader 0.00 (min IPD; least
‘inclusive’)
PPDB: Political Party Database; AIPD: assembly-based intra-party
democracy; IPD: intra-party democracy.
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Plebiscitary IPD. For the calculation of the PIPD index we have two variables tapping into decision-making on manifestoes
and policy issues and two variables on personal selection (Table C3). As they are all dichotomous, the final index value is
simply the arithmetic mean of all variables available.
Table C3. Composition of PIPD.
IPD component IPD variables (PPDB items)
Decision-making: Programme and issues Do all party members have a vote on the manifesto?
Are there intra-party policy ballots in which all party members decide on policy issues?
Decision-making: Personnel Do all party members have a vote in the party leader selection process?
Do all party members have the final vote in the candidate selection process?
Organizational structure No items/variables
PIPD score Arithmetic mean of all variables
PPDB: Political Party Database; PIPD: Plebiscitary IPD-Index; IPD: intra-party democracy.
Table B3. Composition of AIPD.a
IPD
component
Decision-making:
Programme Decision-making: Personnel Organizational structure
IPD variables
(PPDB
items)
Who has the final
vote on the
manifesto?
(1a) Are rules for the selection
of the party leader existent?
Arithmetic mean
of all ‘party leader
variables’
Who is eligible to vote at the party
congress?
(1b) Who has the final vote in the
party leader selection process?
How frequently must a party
congress be held?
(1c) Was there a vote at the most
inclusive stage of the party leader
selection process?
Who has ex officio seats with full
voting rights in the party’s highest
executive body?
(1d) Who was eligible to participate in
this vote (referring to previous
question)?
Prerogatives and accountability of
the party leader?
(2) Who has the final vote in the
candidate selection process?
IPD score
component
Variable score ¼
component
score
Arithmetic mean of (1) ‘party leader selection variables’
and (2) ‘candidate selection variable’
Arithmetic mean of all
‘organizational structure
variables’
IPD score
final
Arithmetic mean of the components ‘DM: programme’, ‘DM: personnel’ and ‘organizational structure’
PPDB: Political Party Database; AIPD: assembly-based intra-party democracy; IPD: intra-party democracy.
a1b and d partially overlap. We have decided to keep both variables to improve precision.
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